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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROSIE LEON,
Appellant,
vs.
Civil No.: 870226

SUSAN PHILLIPS,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SUSAN PHILLIPS

JURISDICTION
This appeal was originally filed pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(1).

It was transferred to this Court

under the pour-over provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(h).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE BELOW
A jury trial was concluded in this matter on February
9, 1987.
jury.

Special interrogatories were submitted to the

The first question pertained to the defendant's

liability.

The jury determined defendant Susan Phillips was

not negligent, therefore, pursuant to the instructions, it did
not answer any further questions.
was entered on March 3, 1987.

A judgment for the defendant

The plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial.

This

Motion was denied by the trial court on May 6, 1987. A Notice
of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was then filed on June 18,
1987.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did Judge Cornaby arbitrarily and

capriciously abuse his discretion by denying the plaintiffs1
motion for a continuance so she could locate and present an
additional witness?
2.

If Judge Cornaby was in error in denying

the plaintiff's Motion for a Continuance, was this error
harmless or was it a prejudicial error?
3.

Did the plaintiff adequately make a proffer

of evidence as to the expected testimony from the witness who
Judge Cornaby ruled could not testify at trial, so that this
Court could adequately review this issue on appeal?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes and rules of civil procedure
may be controlling and determinative of this issue:
a.

Rule 61 - Harmless Error.

No error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the
court or by any of the parties, is ground for
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a
-2-

judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action
appears to the court inconsistent with substantial
justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding
must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding
which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
Nature of the Case
The plaintiff-appellant Rosie Leon filed this
action for personal injuries she allegedly incurred in an
automobile accident on September 3, 1983.
Susan Phillips as a defendant.

Mrs. Leon named

Susan Phillips filed an Answer

denying all liability for the accident.
On October 17, 1986, defendant Phillips1 counsel of
record filed a Motion in Limine asking the Court to enter an
order restricting the plaintiff from calling, among others,
Allen P. Heal as a witness.

This motion was based on the fact

that Mr. Heal had not been included as a witness in the
original pretrial order.
commenced.

On October 22, 1986, a jury trial was

Immediately prior to the commencement of the trial,

the Court granted the motion and did not allow Mr. Heal to
testify.

On the second day of the trial, witness Dr. Brian

Burns made a reference to insurance.

The court granted the

defendant's motion for a mistrial.
Prior to the second trial, the plaintiff's counsel
filed an unsigned pretrial order.

-3-

The order listed Mr. Heal as

a witness.

The pretrial order stated that witness 16,

Mr. Allen P. Heal, had
knowledge concerning the plaintiff's lost
income and earning capacity and that any
future lost earning projections to be used
by these witnesses would be disclosed at
least five (5) days prior to the trial, if
such information is reasonably available to
the plaintiff, or as soon thereafter as
such information is made available to the
plaintiff.
On January 13, 1987, the defendant filed a second
motion to compel asking the Court to enter an Order compelling
the plaintiff to produce various documents, and in addition
asking that several witnesses, including Mr. Heal, not be
allowed to testify.

On January 28, 1987, the Court granted the

defendant's Motion to Compel, and required the plaintiff to
supply all appropriate information to defendant's counsel of
record.

The Court ordered that the plaintiff's witnesses,

including Mr. Heal, would be allowed to testify, but that the
defendant's counsel would be allowed to inquire at trial when
the plaintiff's witnesses received various information.
On February 5, 1987, a three-day jury trial was
commenced.

On February 9, 1987, the jurors returned a

unanimous verdict, answering "no" to the first question: "Was
defendant Susan Phillips negligent."

According to the court's

instructions, no further questions, including question No. 3
pertaining to damages were answered.

-4-

On March 2, 1987, the Court entered an Order
dismissing the plaintiff's Motion for a Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict.

A judgment for the defendant was

entered on March 3, 1987.
The plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial on March
13, 1987.

The plaintiff's Motion was based on Rule 59 of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

On May 6, 1987, the Court

denied the plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial.

The plaintiff's

Notice of Appeal was filed on June 18, 1987.

II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Rosie Leon alleged in her Complaint
that she suffered injuries when a van driven by defendant Susan
Phillips collided with a motor home she was driving.
(Plaintiff's Complaint, para. 2, Record p. 1.)

The

Complaint alleged that defendant Susan Phillips caused the
collision by negligently operating her vehicle.
Susan Phillips denied these allegations.

Defendant

(Defendant's Answer,

Second Defense, para. 3, p. 6.)
The record reflects nothing further about the
testimony of the various witnesses regarding liability.

A

minute entry from the trial states that various witnesses were
sworn and testified.

However, it makes no further reference

about each witness' specific testimony.
-5-

(Minute Entry, p.

27.)

The only testimony on this issue before this Court is the

deposition of Susan Phillips, taken on February 12, 1985.
Susan Phillips stated in that deposition that the truck she was
driving did not hit the motor home, as she missed it by one
foot.

(Depo. of Susan Phillips, p. 10, lines 10-15.)
The jury trial lasted three days.

presented evidence the first two days.

The plaintiff

Defendant's witness,

Nathaniel M. Nord, was sworn and testified during the
second day.

(Minute Entry, p. 218.)

Prior to the first day of trial, a discussion was
held in chambers regarding the testimony of several of
plaintifffs proposed witnesses.
Gilchrist, para. 3, p. 235.)

(Affidavit of Robert G.

The Court ruled at that time that

defendant's counsel could examine plaintiff's proposed experts,
Allen Heal and Roger Schroeder, during the first noon recess.
Defendant's counsel interrogated Mr. Heal at that time.
Mr. Heal indicated that he had not received sufficient
information to prepare a report and thus would not testify.
(Affidavit of Robert G. Gilchrist, para. 6, p. 23 6.)
Mrs. Leon's counsel indicated at that time that he
did not intend to call Mr. Heal as a witness.

Mr. Heal said

there was no purpose in furthering the discussion and it was
terminated.
236.)

(Affidavit of Robert G. Gilchrist, para. 7, p.

Defendant's

counsel then saw Mr. Heal at a grocery

store immediately following this discussion and Mr. Heal again
-6-

indicated he would not be a witness.
4).

(Partial transcript, p.

It was never agreed that Mr. Heal could be called out of

order, that other witnesses would be called in Mr. Heal's
place, or that Mr. Heal would even testify at trial.
On the third day of trial plaintiff called as
witnesses Mrs. Leon, Roger L. Nuttal, and Mrs. Leon on a
re-call.

(Minute Entry, p. 219.)

Plaintiff's counsel then

stated he wanted to call one last witness.
Allen Heal, a rehabilitation specialist.
the court room.

The witness was

Mr. Heal was not in

(Reporter's Partial Transcript of Proceedings,

p. 3.)
Plaintiff's counsel stated that Mr. Heal would
"simply describe the difference between impairments and
disability ratings and to make a simple statement as to the
application of that to this case."
Transcript, p. 3.)

(Reporter's Partial

The Court gave the plaintiff's counsel the

choice of either calling a witness or resting his case.
Plaintiff's counsel then moved to have the trial continued from
10:30 a.m., until 1:30 p.m., so he could arrange to have
Mr. Heal present.

The Court stated it would not grant a

continuance, and reaffirmed its statement at the beginning of
the case that when one side ran out of witnesses, they would
have to rest or submit their case.
Transcript, p. 6.)

-7-

(Reporter's Partial

Mr. Heal did not appear at the trial that afternoon.
There is no further evidence on the record reflecting
Mr* Heal's proposed testimony.

The defendant presented her

witnesses and rested her case.
The case was submitted to the jury.

The jury

returned a verdict finding no negligence on behalf of defendant
Susan Phillips.

Judgment was entered for the defendant and

Motions for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and a New
Trial were made.

Both Motions were denied and this appeal

ensued•

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The appellant's claims on appeal should be dismissed
for one of at least three reasons.
ruling was properly made.

First, Judge Cornaby's

Judge Cornaby, the trial judge,

had discretion in allowing continuances and in controlling the
order of witnesses.

Unless he acted arbitrarily and

capriciously and abused his discretion, the decisions he made
should not be overturned.

Judge Cornaby did not act

arbitrarily or capriciously, therefore his Order denying the
plaintiff's Motion for a Continuance should be allowed to stand.
If Judge Cornaby was in error in not granting the
continuance, any such error was harmless.

Rule 61 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure and the resulting case law hold that
if an error does not go to the merits of an action and instead
-8-

is harmless and on a peripheral point, it is not grounds to
overturn a jury verdict.

The jury found the defendant had not

acted negligently and thus it did not discuss the issue of
damages.

Mr. Heal's testimony related solely to damages.

Therefore, his proposed testimony would not have affected the
jury verdict, and if anything, was harmless error.
Finally, Mr. Heal's testimony was not preserved on
the record.

The plaintiff's counsel had the duty to make a

proffer of Mr. Healfs testimony so it could be reviewed by
this Court.

It was his obligation to show what testimony

Mr. Heal would make and why it would affect the jury verdict.
Mr. Heal did not appear and thus no such proffer was ever
made.

Therefore, without a record, this Court is without a

basis to fully review this matter, and the appeal should be
dismissed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A
CONTINUANCE.
Plaintiff's appeal focuses on the trial court's
refusal to grant her motion for a continuance so witness Alan
Heal could testify.

The request for a continuance was made in

the morning of the third, or last day of trial.

-9-

At

approximately 10:30 a.m. on the last day of trial, the
plaintiff's counsel had completed his re-examination of
plaintiff Rosie Leon.

Plaintiff's counsel informed the

Court that he would like to call Alan Heal, a rehabilitation
witness, as his last witness.
present in the courtroom.

However, Mr. Heal was not

The Court instructed plaintiff's

counsel to call his next witness immediately, or rest his
case.

Plaintiff's counsel moved the Court for a continuance so

he could find Mr. Heal.

The Court denied the motion and

reinstated its previous ruling that plaintiff's counsel should
call his next witness or rest his case.
then rested his case.

Plaintiff's counsel

After the defendant presented her case

the matter was submitted to the jury.
The jury returned a verdict finding no negligence on
behalf of the defendant.
with that verdict.

A judgement was entered in accordance

The Trial Court's denial of plaintiff's

motion for a continuance is the basis upon which this appeal
arisese

Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

pertains to the trial court's discretion in granting or denying
a motion for a continuance.
Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
states as follows:
Upon motion of a party, the court may in
its discretion, and upon such terms as may
be just, including the payment of costs
occasioned by such postponement, postpone a
trial or proceeding upon good cause shown.
-10-

If the motion is made upon the ground of
the absence of evidence, such motion shall
also set forth the materiality of the
evidence expected to be obtained and shall
show that due diligence has been used to
procure it. The court may also require the
party seeking the continuance to state,
upon affidavit or under oath the evidence
he expects to obtain, and if the adverse
party thereupon admits that such evidence
would be given, and that it may be
considered as actually given on the trial,
or offered and excluded as improper, the
trial shall not be postponed upon that
ground.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of the
trial court's discretion in granting or denying a continuance
in Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne, 622 P.2d 800 (Utah
1981).

In Miller, the defendant purchased a car for her son

from the plaintiff.
trouble.

Subsequently the car developed engine

The defendant returned the car to the plaintiff and

stopped payment on the down payment check.

The plaintiff filed

suit for damages resulting from the lost sale.

Judgment was

entered for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.
the

One of

defendant's claims on appeal was that the district court

erred in refusing to grant the defendant a continuance of the
trial.

The defendant's counsel moved for a continuance on the

morning of trial as he was unable to contact his client to
inform her of the trial date.

The district court denied the

motion as the defendant's son was at court and available to
testify, no reason was given for the defendant's counsel's
failure to contact his client, and no proffer of evidence was
-11-

made of the defendant's testimony.

The supreme court held that

the district court had complete discretion in granting or
denying the request for a continuance, that it had not abused
this discretion, and thus upheld the lower court's ruling.
The trial court's discretion in granting or denying a
continuance was also recognized in the criminal matter of
State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985).

In Williams,

the defendant was charged and found guilty of forgery.

At the

beginning of the trial, the defense counsel moved the court for
a continuance to procure testimony of an absent witness.

The

defense counsel advised the court that a third person had
confessed to taking and forging the checks.

He stated that the

testimony of the third person would be relevant to the issue of
the defendant's knowledge of whether or not the checks were
forged.

The trial court denied the request on the basis that

the testimony that would be offered by the third person was
speculative and unlikely to be material.

The supreme court

affirmed the trial court's decision not to grant a
continuance.

The court noted that it is well established that

the granting of a continuance is within the discretion of the
trial judge, and that absent an abuse of that discretion, that
the trial court's decision will not be reversed by this Court.
The denial of a continuance as an element within the
trial court's discretion was also recognized by the Wyoming
Supreme Court in Carlson v. BMW Industrial Service, Inc.,
-12-

744 P.2d 1383 (Wyo. 1987).

In Carlson, a motorcyclist

brought suit against a truck driver for injuries he suffered in
a collision between the motorcycle and truck.

Plaintiff's

counsel moved for a continuance as inclement weather conditions
prohibited one of plaintiff's witness, a doctor, from attending
the trial.

The trial court denied the motion.

On appeal, the

Wyoming Supreme Court held that there was no abuse of
discretion in denying plaintiff's motion.

The court noted that

since the plaintiff had failed to use due diligence in
obtaining either deposition testimony from the witness or in
making alternative travel arrangements that he was not entitled
to a continuance of the trial.

The court concluded by stating

that the plaintiff had gambled on the doctor's attendance at
trial, and thus could not complain when he received a losing
hand.
The situation in the case at hand is similar to those
in Miller, Williams, and Carlson.

The Plaintiff's witness,

Mr. Heal, was not present in the courtroom to testify.

The

Plaintiff's counsel had not exerted due diligence in obtaining
his testimony through a deposition or in some other form.
Instead, as in Carlson, the plaintiff's counsel gambled on
Mr. Heal's attendance at trial and ended up drawing a losing
hand.
Judge Cornaby had discretion to grant or deny the
request for a continuance.

He had previously stated that
-13-

counsel had to have their witnesses present or rest their
case.

Thus, it was not a surprise to either party when he

confirmed this in his ruling denying the continuance.

In

addition, the plaintiff's counsel did not establish that
Mr. Heal's testimony was crucial or that the plaintiff would
suffer prejudice if Mr. Heal was not allowed to appear.

Thus,

since there was a basis for Judge Cornaby's ruling, he did
not act capriciously and his ruling and denial of plaintiff's
motion for a continuance should be affirmed.
The principal case relied on by the plaintiff in her
brief is Slavenburg v. Bautts, 561 P.2d 423 (Kan.
1977).

In Slavenburg, the plaintiff alleged he received

injuries resulting from an automobile accident with the
defendant.

The defendant maintained that the plaintiff's

injuries predated the accident.

On the second day of the

trial, the plaintiff's counsel informed the court that his next
witness would not be available to testify until 1:30 p.m. the
following day.

The court ordered the plaintiff to present his

evidence at 9:00 a.m. the following morning.

When the witness

did not appear at 9:00 a.m., the court announced that the
plaintiff had rested its case.
instructed to proceed.

The defendant's counsel was

The defendant's first witness, a

medical expert, was on his way but had not yet arrived at the
courthouse.

The court then proceeded to give jury instructions

and did not let the defendant's witness testify when he
-14-

appeared.

A verdict was entered for the plaintiff.

The

defendant filed an appeal and claimed that the trial court
erred in refusing to continue the trial to allow him an
opportunity to present his witness.

The Kansas Supreme Court

reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages.
In so doing, the court balanced the following seven factors.
1.

Counsel's diligence and effort to gain
attendance of the witness,

2.

The reason the witness was not present,

3.

The nature of the witness's expected testimony,

4.

Whether the testimony is critical or merely
cumulative,

5.

The amount of delay expected,

6.

The effect of the delay on the docket of the
court,

7.

The overall injustice which might result if the
delay were denied.

After reviewing these factors the Kansas Supreme Court found
that the defendant had suffered prejudice because of the
plaintiff's counsel's actions, that the proposed testimony was
material and not cumulative, and that therefore an injustice
had occurred when the defendant's motion was not granted.
The case at hand can be distinguished from
Slavenburg for several reasons.

First and foremost,

Mr. Heal's testimony dealt solely with the issue of damages.
In Slavenburg, the jury found negligence on part of the
defendant which necessarily left the issue of damages to be
-15-

decided.

Here, however, the issue of damages did not need to

be decided and was irrelevant as the jury found no negligence
on the part of the defendant.
Second, when the other factors referred to in
Slavenburg are balanced, it is apparent the plaintiff's
motion was properly denied.

Plaintiff's counsel did not

exercise due diligence in obtaining Mr. Heal's testimony.
The plaintiff's counsel knew the order and timing of his
witnesses.

Mr. Healfs absence was not caused by emergency or

necessity.

Therefore, he should have been in court when needed.
The delay would have caused an additional trial day.

Judge Cornaby stated that delaying the trial would effect and
upset his court docket.

And lastly, no injustice was done at

the hands of the district court as the jury ruled the defendant
had not acted negligently.

Instead, substantial justice was

accomplished as the jury made a full factual determination on
the issue of liability.
In conclusion, firmly established Utah law and the
facts of this case indicate that the trial court acted
correctly and within its discretion in denying the plaintiff's
motion for a continuance of the trial.

Therefore, the trial

court's Order should be reaffirmed and this appeal should be
dismissed.

-16-

POINT II
SINCE THE JURY DETERMINED THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE
ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT, THE TRIAL COURT'S
DENIAL OF THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE
WAS ONLY HARMLESS ERROR.
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
addresses harmless error.

Rule 61 states as follows:

No error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence, and no error or
defect in any ruling or order or in
anything done or omitted by the court or by
any of the parties, is grounds for granting
a new trial or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take
such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The
court at every stage of the proceeding must
disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.
At the conclusion of the case below, a special
verdict form was submitted to the jury.
defendant had not acted negligently.

The jury found the

Pursuant to Rule 49 the

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the jury was instructed
on the special verdict form not to answer any further questions
if it found the defendant had not acted negligently.

Since the

jury found no negligence on the defendant, they therefore never
discussed the issue of damages.
The Utah Supreme Court dealt with a similar fact
situation and the issue of harmless error in the recent case of
King v. Ferraday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987).

In King, the

plaintiff and defendant were involved in an automobile
-17-

accident.

The plaintiff brought suit for his alleged personal

injuries.

The jury found the defendant was not negligent, but

found that the plaintiff was 100% at fault.

There was no

indication that the jury ever discussed damages.

As grounds

for appeal, the plaintiff argued in part, that the trial court
erred in not submitting a jury instruction pertaining to
damages.

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that although

the case was ripe for appeal, that it would not consider the
propriety of the ruling because any error in refusing to give
the instruction was harmless.

The court based its holding on

the fact that since the jury found no negligence in the actions
of the defendant, that the issue of damages was irrelevant.
Hence, any error relating to the alleged damages was harmless.
The issue of harmless error was addressed by the
Nevada Supreme Court in Yturralde v. Barney's Club, Inc.,
87 Nev. 249, 484 P.2d 1079 (1971).

In Yturralde, a woman

was patronizing Barney's Club when she was physically struck
by another patron who was intoxicated.
an action for her injuries.

The plaintiff brought

During the trial, the plaintiff

moved the court for a continuance so that a medical witness,
who was in surgery at the time of trial, could appear.

The

request was denied as no offer of proof was made as to the
doctor's testimony.

In addition, the Judge based his ruling on

the fact that he warned counsel to have witnesses available to
avoid delay.

The jury held in favor of the defendant.
-18-

On

appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court held that because Barney's
Club was absolved of any negligence, and the jury never reached
the issue of damages, that the refusal to grant the continuance
was only harmless error.
The facts of the case at hand are similar to those in
King v, Ferraday, supra, and Yturralde v. Barney's
Club, supra.

In the case at hand, one of the plaintiff's

basis for this appeal was the trial court's denial of the
plaintiff's motion for a continuance so that she could call a
rehabilitation expert to testify on the issue of damages.

As

noted above, the instructions on the special verdict form
stated the jury did not need to discuss the issue of damages if
they found the defendant was not negligent, as the issue of
damages would then be irrelevant.

Therefore, substantial

justice was accomplished as the jury made a full factual
inquiry and found no negligence.

Hence the question of damages

was irrelevant and would have wasted the jury's time.

Thus, if

there was any error at the trial court level, it was harmless,
and as stated in Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, is not grounds for reversal.

-19-

POINT III
ALLEN HEAL'S TESTIMONY WAS NOT PROPERLY PRESERVED
FOR THE RECORD.
Plaintiff's appeal focuses on the trial court's
refusal to grant a continuance so Allen Heal could testify. The
only proffer of evidence pertaining to Mr. Heal's
testimony is included in the reporter's partial transcript of
proceedings.

On page 3 of that transcript, plaintiff's counsel

stated as follows:
That witness is Allen Heal, the
rehabilitation specialist and I have
expressed to counsel my desire to call him
now to simply describe the difference
between impairments and disability ratings
and to make a simple statement as to the
application of that to this case.
The plaintiff's counsel made no further proffer to the record.
Preservation of evidence in the record is controlled
by Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

That rule states

as follows:
(a)

Effect of erroneous ruling.
Error may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of
the party is affected, and
.

(2)

.

.

Offer of proof.

In case the ruling is one excluding
evidence, the substance of the
evidence was made known to the
court by offer or was apparent from
-20-

the context within which questions
were asked.
(b)

Record of offering and ruling.
The court may add any other or further
statement which shows the character of
the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the
ruling thereon. It may direct the
making of an offer in question and
answer form.

The Utah Rules of Evidence are patterned after the
Federal Rules of Civil Evidence.

The notes of the Advisory

Committee to the Federal Rules state that the purpose of rule
103(2) "is to reproduce for an appellate court, insofar as
possible, a true reflection of what occurred in the trial
court.

It is designed to resolve doubts as to what testimony

the witness would have in fact given, and, in non-jury cases,
to provide the appellate court with material for a possible
final disposition of the case in the event of a reversal of a
ruling which excluded evidence."

Moore's Federal Practice,

Part 2, 1988 Ed., p. 18.
The Utah Supreme Court has had several occasions to
apply this rule.

An example of such a case is Reliable

Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters,
380 P.2d 135 (Utah 1963).

In Reliable Furniture Co., the

Supreme Court was faced with an appellate review of a summary
judgment the trial court had granted because of four
depositions.

Two of the depositions were not present in the
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record, the other two were sealed.

Therefore, the Supreme

Court affirmed the summary judgment on the basis that the
appellant had not met its burden in preserving a record which
it could review.

The court in that regard stated as follows:

Under simple principles of appellate
review, we cannot consider matters not in
the record before the trial court, absence
of which was made apparent on examinations
of the record filed with this court.
Id. at 136.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled the same way in
similar cases.

See Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne,

622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981) (appellant's duty to reserve record on
appeal).
manner.

Courts of other jurisdictions have also ruled in this
See Muller v. City of Albuquerque, 587 P.2d 42

(N.M. 1978) (it is appellant's duty to see that proper record
is made for review).

Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777

(5th Cir. 1980) (function and offer of proof is to inform
the court what counsel expects to show by the excluded
evidence, citing Weinstein's

Evidence § 103(03) (1979)].

This appeal involves the proposed testimony of
witness Allen Heal.

The plaintiff has objected to the court's

order that denied her a continuance so Mr. Heal could testify.
Once the court made its ruling, the plaintiff had the burden
under Rule 103 of preserving Mr. Heal's expected testimony in
the record.

This could have been done by a question and answer

format out of the view of the jury, or by an extended proffer
-22-

statement by plaintiff's counsel.

Neither of these was done.

Instead, the plaintiff's attorney stated in one sentence that
Mr. Heal would testify about the difference between impairments
and disability ratings, and that this would apply to this case.
There is nothing in the record to explain why
impairments or disability ratings were applicable and how they
would apply to this case.

Therefore, this court is faced with

a blank slate in regards to Mr. Heal's testimony and its
application to this case.

Since this court cannot review this

testimony, and determine if it was relevant, the plaintiff has
not met her burden to preserve an adequate record and this
appeal should be dismissed.
The plaintiff has alleged in Point I of her agreement
that Mr. Heal's testimony would be relevant to the issue of
liability.

She alleges that Mr. Heal's testimony would have

shown she was injured and thus that the defendant acted
negligently to cause the alleged collision.
The plaintiff's argument is an attempt to argue
indirectly that the finding of no negligence on behalf of the
defendant is unsupported by the evidence.

She attempts to do

so by stating only that Mr. Heal's testimony would have
supported her position.
If the plaintiff wishes to attack the jury's
findings, she has the burden under Rule 11(e) of the Rules of
the Court of Appeals to include in the record a transcript of
-23-

all evidence relevant to such findings or conclusions.
has not been done.

This

Thus the issue of the correctness of the

juryfs findings should not be addressed by this Court.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that
where it is reviewing the correctness of a verdict, that it
will review the record in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, and then will refrain from disturbing the
ruling if it is substantially supported by the record.

In

Charlton v. Hackett, 360 P.2d 176 (Utah 1961), the Supreme
Court stated the cardinal rules of appellate review as follows:
1. To indulge them (findings and judgment of the
trial court) with a presumption of validity and
correctness;
2. To require the appellant to sustain the
burden of showing error;
3. To review the record in the light most
favorable to them; and
4. Not to disturb them if they find substantial
support in the evidence.
Id. at 176.
The Utah Supreme Court has followed these rules in
numerous decisions.

See Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing

Corp., 404 P.2d 30 (Utah 1965) (judgment at trial court is
presumptively correct and burden to show grounds for reversal
is upon appellant.

The Supreme Court reviews the evidence in

the light most favorable to the findings.)

Hutcheson v.

Gleave, 632 P.2d 815 (Utah 1981) (rule of appellate review
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requires presumption of validity and review of evidence in
light most favorable to supporting findings.)

(Searle v.

Searle# 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974) (actions at trial court are
indulged with presumption of validity and burden is upon
appellant to prove a basis for reversal.)
The only evidence on the record before this court
pertaining to the issue of liability are the defendant's
statements in her depositions.

She stated that her vehicle did

not strike the plaintiff's vehicle.

These statements must be

viewed in the light that is most favorable to the defendant.
When these statements are viewed in this light, and as they are
not contradicted by any other evidence on the appellate record,
the plaintiff cannot show that the findings were not supported
by the record.

Thus, since the finding of no negligence was

supported by the record at hand, this Court should not overturn
it on this appeal.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there is no reason for this Court to
overturn the trial court's ruling.

The plaintiff had her

day in court and a chance to present all evidence on the
liability issues.

The jury then decided that this accident was

not caused by the defendant.
The plaintiff is now complaining in this appeal that
the trial court erred in not granting her a continuance during
-25-

the trial.

The trial court did not act arbitrarily or

capriciously in denying this motion based on the circumstances
before it.

It was not faced with an unsuspected surprise or

condition caused by something that counsel could not prevent or
correct.
Even if this ruling was in error, it was not
prejudicial, but merely harmless error.
Mr. Heal went to the issue of damages.
address this issue.

The testimony of
The jury never had to

Thus, his testimony would have been

irrelevant.
Finally, the record does not properly record
Mr. Heal's proposed testimony.

Thus, this Court cannot review

how it pertains to the issues at hand.

Therefore, for this and

the foregoing reasons, the respondent/defendant Susan Phillips
respectfully requests that this Court find that there was no
error committed during the trial of this matter, and therefore
affirm the jury verdict and resulting judgment of the trial
court.
DATED this

/6^

day of

TTl^^

, 1988.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
^ ^ ^ j ^ ^
Robert G. Gilchrist
Attorney for Respondent
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